{"id":810,"date":"2010-08-22T10:06:37","date_gmt":"2010-08-22T10:06:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/?p=810"},"modified":"2010-08-22T15:23:58","modified_gmt":"2010-08-22T15:23:58","slug":"skin-in-the-game-why-banks-are-blowing-up","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/?p=810","title":{"rendered":"Skin in the game &#8211; why banks are blowing up"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>King of the Quants, Paul Wilmott, has a <a href=\"http:\/\/www.wilmott.com\/blogs\/paul\/index.cfm\/2008\/3\/10\/This-is-No-Longer-Funny\">great blog post<\/a> on his very popular site about the current financial crisis. If you&#8217;re wondering how popular a site about quantitative finance can be then consider there&#8217;s about a 65,000 subscribers engaging in debate (some heated, some light-hearted &amp; some perhaps ridiculous) on his forum.<\/p>\n<p>Wilmott is the author of the authoritative textbooks on the subjects relating to financial modelling of derivatives. So you&#8217;d be thinking <em>&#8220;it&#8217;s all his fault&#8221;<\/em> and you&#8217;d be wrong. In his writings and courses you&#8217;d be hard pressed to find a <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.investopedia.com\/terms\/r\/rocketscientist.asp\">&#8220;rocket scientist&#8221;<\/a><\/em> more skeptical of the limitations of risk management using financial models. Unless you happened to be Naseem Taleb but that&#8217;s another story.<!--more--><\/p>\n<p>He&#8217;s written a blunt wake up call, stating why he believes some derivatives are just too dangerous to be traded (esp. CDO&#8217;s) in large quantities due to inadequate models for their behaviour and the misappropriate incentives for risk management inherent in the salaries of quants, traders and salesmen.<\/p>\n<p>As Wilmott says<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;Risk managers have no incentive to limit risk. If the traders don\u2019t take risks and make money, the risk managers won\u2019t make money.&#8221; <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em> <\/em><span style=\"font-size: 13.3333px;\">If ever there was a misnomer it&#8217;s risk management in investment banks. A major problem is that management conveys the meaning that the <em>&#8220;managed&#8221; <\/em>can be confidently and competently controlled, steered on a path. For example, we don&#8217;t call lion taming &#8211; <em>&#8220;Lion Attitudinal Management&#8221; <\/em>but we would if the lions tamed were on Wall St. It&#8217;s this mislabeling that makes systems with a propensity towards <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Cascading_failure\">cascade failure<\/a> every few years seem safe and predictable. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 13.3333px;\"> I think one solution is to ensure that the well remunerated traders and salesmen must keep <strong>skin in the game<\/strong>. Personal ownership of the rewards &amp; punishments for the long term performance of their portfolio. So long as they are rewarded today in cold hard cash for trades where the value can&#8217;t accurately be determined until a future date then there&#8217;s no incentive on the individuals for risk mitigation. Having a greater margin of safety in their transactions, reduces profits and ultimately their bonuses under the current system. It&#8217;s economics101 that they&#8217;ll respond to this incentive. Banks\/funds\/etc. will say that they put in place organisation-wide risk management strategies and calculate <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Value_at_risk\">Value at Risk<\/a> to say but ethical quants like Wilmott and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ederman.com\/new\/index.html\">Emanuel Derman<\/a> point out the flaws and contradictions both the process and mathematics of this apparent circumspection. Of course the bank doesn&#8217;t want to blow up. But a bank is made up of individuals and if those sloshing the most amount of cash around, betting the company&#8217;s future, can systematically risk more than is prudent then what&#8217;s the point of the oversight? You don&#8217;t need rogue traders to screw up a system that&#8217;s gone rogue in the 1st place. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 13.3333px;\">The answer to the problem lies in the very <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Black%E2%80%93Scholes\">Black-Scholes<\/a> formula that enables banks to issue and hedge these bonds in the first place. The recipe for taking a bit of security A, a smattering of security B and some cash and chucking out the &#8220;risk managing&#8221; security the customer wants. Pay a sizeable part of bonuses parties in bonds derived as an index of their trades that year and you&#8217;ll see a lot more consideration of the risk Wall St has cheerfully exposed Main St. to. \u00a0A trader, like a lion, is an animal with a very acute sense of incentives and an eagerness to respond to them at all times \ud83d\ude42<\/span><\/p>\n<p>It might not be a popular initiative in finance houses who use the tagline &#8220;creating greater liquidity&#8221; to describe so much speculation. The powerful intuitive force of John Maynard Keynes, as in so many assessments, was bang on the money when he said<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done&#8221;<\/em> &#8212; JM Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>King of the Quants, Paul Wilmott, has a great blog post on his very popular site about the current financial crisis. If you&#8217;re wondering how popular a site about quantitative finance can be then consider there&#8217;s about a 65,000 subscribers engaging in debate (some heated, some light-hearted &amp; some perhaps ridiculous) on his forum. Wilmott [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19,15],"tags":[1711],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/810"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=810"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/810\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":822,"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/810\/revisions\/822"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=810"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=810"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/gaisan.com\/blogs\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=810"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}